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Authors : 1. Elena Yu. Popova,
Senior Lecturer of the Department of Economic Theory and Public Administration, Institute of Economics an Education
Kemerovo State University
Models of social sector management from the viewpoint of distribution of residual property rights (by the example of higher education)
Objective: to identify the features in distribution of residual property rights in the social sector of the economy by the example of higher education.
Methods: literature analysis, methods and models of new institutional economic theory, primarily contract theory.
Results: the existing models of social sector management are reviewed. The strategies of employees’ behavior, set by these models, are shown. On this basis, various options for the distribution of residual property rights in the higher education management system are analyzed. It is shown that even with the dominant role of the state, a part of these rights can be delegated to other subjects – the professional community or consumers of educational services. It is concluded that the reforms currently implemented in Russia contribute to the consolidation of residual rights in the Ministry of Science and Higher Education with the possibility of their partial subsequent transfer to employers.
Scientific novelty: models of the social sector management are considered from the viewpoint of distribution of residual property rights, which allows in each case to allocate subjects that can influence the process of producing socially significant goods.
Practical significance: the results obtained can be used in assessing the effectiveness of the state policy in the field of education.
Keywords :
Socio-economic aspects of higher education development; Residual property rights; Social sector; Contract; Company; Hierarchy
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Citation :
Popova E. Yu. Models of social sector management from the viewpoint of distribution of residual property rights (by the example of higher education), Actual Problems of Economics and Law, 2019, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 1592–1604 (in Russ.). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21202/1993-047X.13.2019.4.1592-1604
Type of article : The scientific article
Date of receipt of the article :
05.06.2019
Date of adoption of the print :
08.11.2019
Date of online accommodation :
25.12.2019
