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**Authors : **1. Inna A. Biryukova,
student

*Samara National Research University named after Acad. S. P. Korolev (Samara University)*

2. Mikhail I. Geras’kin,
Doctor of Economics, professor, Head of the Department of Matyhematical methods in Economics

*Samara National Research University named after Acad. S. P. Korolev (Samara University)*

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Structural analysis of oligopoly market based on the reflective game model by the example of telecommunication market in Russia

**Objective:** to analyze the possible structures of the oligopoly market distribution by the example of telecommunication industry in terms of the agents’ reflexive behavior.

**Methods:** game theory, economic-mathematical modeling.

**Results:** the article states that one of the first objects in the game theory is an oligopoly market. Based on the analysis of game theory studies, it was found that there is a need to achieve information equilibrium in reflexive games of three agents in the oligopoly market. To solve this problem, we analyzed all possible representations of the agents, leading to the set of games in the Russian telecommunications market for three agents: OJSC “MTS”, OJSC “Megafon” and OJSC “Vympelcom”. Three reflection grades were studied: 1) representations of the agent about other agents, 2) representations of the agent’s perception of other agents about it and 3) representations of the agent about what its competitors think about the first agent’s opinion about the other two. As a result, the general patterns were revealed of the expressions of conjectural variations in each case; it was proved that further detailing of the reflection is not needed. As a result of calculations, the models of informational equilibriums of the Russian telecommunication market were constructed; for that, the averaged values of the demand and cost functions parameters functions of cellular communication operators were taken. It was also revealed that in 2015 the actual telecommunication market in the Russian Federation qualitatively, i.e. by the ratio of market shares, was close to equilibrium on condition of first rank reflexive behavior for the case when the market leader, OJSC “MTS”, represents its counterparties – OJSC “Megafon” and OJSC “Vympelcom” – as the driven agents.

**Scientific novelty:** the analytical expressions for the information equilibrium parameters (issues and profits of the agents, aggregate output and prices) are obtained in the oligopoly market with a linear demand function, linear cost functions of agents with equal marginal and fixed costs, for arbitrary reflection grades.

**Practical significance: **the obtained set of informational equilibriums may be used to compare it to the actual equilibriums of the Russian telecommunications market to assess the reflection grades of its agents.

**Keywords : **
Economics and national economy management; Reflection; Grade; Reflexive games; Agent; Stackelberg equilibrium; Oligopoly; Conjectural variation; Telecommunication market

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**Citation : **
Biryukova I. A., Geras’kin M. I. Structural analysis of oligopoly market based on the reflective game model by the example of telecommunication market in Russia, Actual Problems of Economics and Law, 2017, vol. 11, No. 4, рp. 66–81 (in Russ.). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21202/1993-047X.11.2017.4.66-81

**Type of article : **The scientific article

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Date of receipt of the article : *

09.06.2017

Date of adoption of the print :

16.10.2017

Date of online accommodation :

25.12.2017