DOI: 10.21202/1993-047X.10.2016.1.97-123

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Регулирование как делегирование

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Цель: рассмотрение идеи обратного делегирования, когда государство является принципалом, а частные лица – агентами с точки зрения бихевиористской теории «принципал – агент».

Методы: статистический, социологического опроса.

Результаты: государство принимает за нас решения либо помогает нам прийти к решению, которое считает наиболее правильным, в самых разных областях, начиная от пенсионных накоплений, топливного сектора и продажи лекарств и заканчивая потребительским кредитованием и потреблением продуктов питания, т. е. выполняет функции нашего агента. С точки зрения теории «принципал – агент» и бихевиористской теории «принципал – агент» большу́ю долю регулирования в современном мире можно расценивать как гипотетическое делегирование. В статье, переходя от благосостояния отдельного человека к проблеме общественного благосостояния, рассматривается идея обратного делегирования, когда государство служит принципалом, а частные лица – агентами. Показано, что природа делегирования меняется в зависимости от контекста. В статье описаны условия, при которых тот или иной подход будет иметь смысл.

Научная новизна: работа посвящена зарубежному опыту регулирования через делегирование полномочий на примере страны с развитой рыночной экономикой (США), показаны перспективы данного подхода в решении как публичных, так и частных задач. Рассматривается применение теории «принципал – агент» и бихевиористской теории «принципал – агент» для разграничения таких видов гипотетического делегирования, как информирование, стандартные правила, поощрения, возвраты, мандаты и запреты. Разобраны преимущества и затраты на делегирование, определены обстоятельства, при которых тот или иной подход имеет смысл.

Практическая значимость: теория «принципал – агент» широко применяется в экономике и политологии и может служить удобным инструментом для рассмотрения оптимального масштаба и сущности той помощи, которую предоставляет нам государство в качестве нашего агента. Работа представляет интерес для отечественной юридической науки, поскольку в России институт делегирования является малоизученным правовым явлением.
 

Ключевые слова :

гражданское право; бихевиористская теория «принципал – агент»; теория «принципал – агент»; регулирование; делегирование

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Оригинальная публикация: https://academic.oup.com/jla/article/7/1/1/891422

Цитирование :

Русскоязычная версия: Бар-Гилл О., Санстейн К. Регулирование как делегирование // Актуальные проблемы экономики и права. 2016. № 1. С. 97–123.

Тип статьи : Научная статья

Дата поступления статьи :
02.02.2016

Дата принятия в печать :
28.02.2016

Дата онлайн размещения :
15.04.2016