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Актуальные проблемы
экономики и права

 

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DOI: 10.21202/1993-047X.15.2021.1.135-173

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Авторы :
1. Карла Л. Рейес, ассистент преподавателя права, директор Центра права, технологий и инноваций
Школа права Университета штата Мичиган



(Не)корпоративное криптоуправление


Цель: создание структуры корпоративного управления и механизма правового регулирования блокчейн-протоколов.


Методы: диалектический подход к познанию социальных явлений, позволяющий проанализировать их в историческом развитии и функционировании в контексте совокупности объективных и субъективных факторов, который определил выбор следующих методов исследования: формально-логический, сравнительно-правовой и социологический.


Результаты: технология блокчейна возникла из идеи шифропанков о возможности регулирования без вмешательства в частную жизнь. Основываясь на этой идее, многие члены экосистемы блокчейн-технологии призывают рассматривать код как единственный закон, применимый к блокчейн-протоколам, проводимым с его помощью транзакциям и объектам доступа к данным. В настоящее время код некоторых протоколов, таких как Bitcoin и Ethereum, воплощает первоначальную культуру шифропанков, а именно отдает приоритет неприкосновенности частной жизни и сохраняющим ее механизмам управления. Однако этот код может измениться. Фактически принятые и насаждаемые правительствами законы могут служить стимулами для таких изменений. На самом деле такие стимулы уже действуют во благо или во вред, когда программисты прекращают свою работу из страха преследования по закону. Принятие контрактной системы управления, в которой четко определены правила и ожидания, даст возможность сообществам блокчейн-протоколов максимально сохранить свою культуру и принципы. Это также заставит указанные сообщества вступить в открытый, активный и вдумчивый диалог относительно своей коллективной культуры и принципов. Кроме того, формирование структур управления блокчейном на основе контрактов, которые сходны со структурами корпоративного управления, позволит блокчейн-сообществам воспользоваться богатейшим опытом исследований и экспериментов в функционально эквивалентной области управления.


Научная новизна: в работе обосновано, что самое сильное влияние (не)корпоративное криптоуправление может оказать на культуру традиционных корпораций. Важное положение модели корпоративного управления для механизма управления «вне блокчейна» состоит в признании того, что «код как закон» – это подсистема правовых норм внутри правовой системы. Системный анализ показывает, что необходимо признать обоюдное влияние взаимосвязанных функций кода и права в процессе ограничения поведения в экосистемах блокчейна. Иными словами, код определяет правовые нормы и их приложение к экосистеме блокчейна, а право, в свою очередь, определяет действия, предпринимаемые через код. В результате такое взаимопересечение кода и права оказывает влияние и на наше понимание возможностей применения права к более традиционным сценариям.


Практическая значимость: основные положения и выводы статьи могут быть использованы в научной, педагогической и правоприменительной деятельности при рассмотрении вопросов, связанных с (не)корпоративным криптоуправлением.


Ключевые слова :

блокчейн-технологии; блокчейн-протоколы; криптовалюта; криптоуправление; экосистема; код; Bitcoin; Ethereum; биткоин; эфириум


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Цитирование :

Рейес К. Л. (Не)корпоративное криптоуправление // Актуальные проблемы экономики и права. 2021. Т. 15, № 1. С. 135–173. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21202/1993-047X.15.2021.1.135-173


Тип статьи : Научная статья

Дата поступления статьи :
01.02.2021

Дата принятия в печать :
02.03.2021

Дата онлайн размещения :
25.03.2021